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WRITING IT RIGHT
Plagiarism in Lawyers’ 
Written Advocacy (Part II)
By Douglas E. Abrams  
 This two-part article discusses 
disciplinary sanctions that have been, 
and may be, imposed on lawyers who 
commit plagiarism in briefs and other 
filings submitted to the court. Part I 
discussed decisions that have found 
or intimated that counsel’s plagia-
rism violated Rule 8.4(c) of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which states that it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation.” 
 Part II now discusses why, as an 
independent ground for sanction, 
lawyers’ plagiarism in written submis-
sions to the court also violates Model 
Rule 8.4(d), which reaches lawyers 
who “engage in conduct that is preju-
dicial to the administration of justice.” 
Courts, however, have yet to explore 
advocates’ plagiarism through the 
Model Rule 8.4(d) lens. 
PREJUDICE TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
 “If our adversary system is to 
function according to design,” wrote 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, “we must 
assume that an attorney will observe 
his responsibilities to the legal system, 
as well as to his client.”46 By upsetting 
this design, counsel’s plagiarism in a 
submission to the court violates Model 
Rule 8.4(d) as “conduct that is preju-
dicial to the administration of justice.” 
The lawyer’s plagiarism creates a 
genuine risk that the court’s written 
opinion itself will inadvertently pla-
giarize, and also distorts the meaning 
and import of the lawyer’s adversary 
argument on the client’s behalf. 
Inadvertent Judicial 
Plagiarism  
 As “an officer of the legal system,”47 
a lawyer submits briefs and other 
papers with the expectation that the 
court may incorporate portions of the 
prevailing party’s argument and analy-
sis in the opinion that accompanies 
the interlocutory or final decision.48 
Whether or not the opinion cites to the 
lawyer’s submission, incorporation 
can be a professional badge of honor 
for counsel who prevail. “When an 
attorney writes such an excellent brief 
that some of its passages make their 
way into the eventual decision, he 
experiences a sense of gratification,” 
said Chief Justice George Rossman of 
the Oregon Supreme Court more than 
a half century ago.49
 The prospect of judicial incorpora-
tion means that unless the judge or 
law clerk parses the parties’ briefs 
and other submissions in search of 
paragraphs or pages of copied work, a 
plagiarizing lawyer’s “literary theft”50 
can land in the written opinion as the 
court’s own inadvertent literary theft. 
Successful parsing is by no means 
guaranteed because in the academic 
arena, as elsewhere, much plagiarism 
goes undetected despite determined ef-
forts to uncover it. Whether or not ju-
dicial sleuthing for lawyers’ plagiarism 
actually detects unauthorized copying 
in any of the hundreds of cases that 
busy courts consider each year, how-
ever, sleuthing would compromise the 
sound administration of justice by ex-
pending time and other finite resources 
that courts can more efficiently spend 
managing their “pressing dockets” and 
deciding cases.51      
 The court’s inadvertent incorpora-
tion of plagiarized portions of a brief 
may smack of shortcutting that ques-
tions the competence and diligence 
that the ABA Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct expects from judges.52 Where 
the lawyer plagiarizes an article or 
other private source, the court’s incor-
poration may also smack of misap-
propriating intellectual property, and 
thus may implicate “impropriety and 
the appearance of impropriety” that 
the judicial code summons judges to 
avoid.53  Inadvertence would remove 
basis for judicial discipline, but would 
not necessarily blunt public or pro-
fessional criticism of the judge, who 
holds ultimate “responsibility person-
ally to decide the matter” under the 
judicial code.54        
 The Illinois Supreme Court has held 
that lawyers’ plagiarism “displays an 
extreme cynicism towards the property 
rights of others” and “a lack of hones-
ty.”55 “All honest scholars are the real 
victims.”56 When lawyers infect the 
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proceeding with plagiarism that may 
find its way into the court’s opinion, 
they prejudice the administration of 
justice because the ABA Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct summons judges 
to “aspire at all times to conduct that 
insures the greatest possible public 
confidence in their . . . integrity.”57 
 “Judges hold a position of public 
trust,” concludes Chief Justice John 
G. Roberts, Jr., “and the public has a 
right to demand that they adhere to a 
demanding code of conduct.”58 At the 
least, this aspiration and public right 
contemplate that judges will meet the 
standards of integrity that Model Rule 
8.4 demands from the lawyers who 
appear before them.  
Distorting the Adversary 
Argument  
 “[T]he judicial process [is] at its 
best,” wrote Justice Felix Frankfurter, 
when courts receive “comprehensive 
briefs and powerful arguments on 
both sides.”59  Counsel’s plagiarism 
compromises the sound administration 
of justice (and, as Justices Frankfurter 
and Marshall suggested, may also 
weaken the client’s cause) by inducing 
the court to mistake the brief’s copied 
passages as products of counsel’s own 
partisan thought processes, rather 
than as an uncompensated non-party’s 
analysis presumably helpful to the 
proponent. “[C]ases are won on the 
facts and the law,” said Judge John C. 
Godbold of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the 11th Circuit, “not on the 
eminence, polished writing, oratory, or 
personality of counsel.”60  
 The three decisions discussed in 
Part I of this article demonstrate how 
undetected plagiarism can distort the 
meaning and import of the adversary 
argument that underlies judicial 
decision-making. In United States 
v. Bowen, defense counsel sought to 
overturn the client’s 30-year prison 
sentence with a brief that appeared 
to reflect counsel’s own unadorned 
argumentation.  Counsel would have 
reduced the prospect of judicial error 
by candidly informing the 6th Circuit 
panel that the argument rested on the 
earlier opinion of the Massachusetts 
district court, which held constitutional 
authority to hear and decide the merits 
without a personal or professional 
stake in the outcome.  
 In In re Burghoff, counsel disserved 
the administration of justice by failing 
to inform the bankruptcy court that 
his analysis reflected the presumably 
disinterested perspectives of two 
prominent practitioners in a law 
review article, or at least by failing 
to cite the article and invite the court 
to consider it for whatever value 
the court might ascribe. Similarly, 
in Kingvision Pay Per View, Ltd. 
v. Wilson, counsel overlooked the 
prospect that the court might have 
deliberated differently if it had known 
that argumentation came from the 
iconic multi-volume Wright-Miller-
Cooper federal civil practice treatise, 
and not from counsel’s own prose 
created on retainer.
CONCLUSION
 Reported decisions calling atten-
tion to lawyers’ plagiarism were rare 
before about 2000.61 Plagiarism today, 
however, imposes professional embar-
rassment when the list of counsels’ ap-
pearances or the court’s opinion itself 
identifies the lawyer whose “literary 
theft”62 fits so naturally within Model 
Rule 8.4(c)’s recitation of “conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”63 Even where the 
court does not recommend a sanc-
tion for violation,64 being labeled a 
plagiarist in the bound reporter or on 
electronic retrieval is a serious profes-
sional setback for a lawyer, whose 
reputation for integrity is a core per-
sonal asset.65 
 Lawyers’ plagiarism also violates 
Model Rule 8.4(d) as “conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”66 Not only does this plagia-
rism create genuine risk of inadvertent 
plagiarism by the court, but it also 
distorts the meaning and import of 
the adversary argument that underlies 
reasoned decision-making. 
 “The process of deciding cases on 
appeal,” wrote Chief Justice Arthur T. 
Vanderbilt of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, “involves the joint efforts of 
counsel and the court. It is only when 
each branch of the profession performs 
its function properly that justice can 
be administered to the satisfaction of 
both the litigants and society and a 
body of decisions developed that will 
be a credit to the bar, the courts and 
the state.”67
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